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Human dynamics is known to be inhomogeneous and bursty but the detailed understanding of the
role of human factors in bursty dynamics is still lacking. In order to investigate their role we devise
an agent-based model, where an agent in an uncertain situation tries to reduce the uncertainty
by communicating with information providers while having to wait time for responses. Here the
waiting time can be considered as cost. We show that the optimal choice of the waiting time
under uncertainty gives rise to the bursty dynamics, characterized by the heavy-tailed distribution
of optimal waiting time. We find that in all cases the efficiency for communication is relevant to the
scaling behavior of the optimal waiting time distribution. On the other hand the cost turns out in
some cases to be irrelevant depending on the degree of uncertainty and efficiency.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge,89.65.-s,89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, significant amount of digital data on the be-
havior of individuals has enabled us to quantitatively ex-
plore the various patterns of human dynamics. One of
the robust findings is that human dynamics is not ran-
dom but correlated, such that the bursts of rapidly oc-
curing events alternate with long inactive periods [1–7].
The bursty dynamics is typically characterized by the
heavy tailed or power-law distributions of waiting time
or inter-event time τ as P (τ) ∼ τ−α with α ≈ 1 and
0.7 for e-mail and mobile phone call (MPC) communica-
tions [2, 7], respectively. The origin of bursts in human
dynamics has been debated for the past few years. The
bursts can emerge from the individual selection of tasks
from the task list according to the protocol “the highest
priority task first” [2, 8]. The long waiting time of a task
with low priority leads to the heavy tail of the waiting
time distribution. This model assumes that there are at
least two tasks to be compared, which is not necessarily
the case in reality. On the other hand the circadian and
weekly activity patterns of humans can also result in the
long periods of inactivity that contribute to the heavy
tails [9]. In this approach the circadian and weekly pat-
terns have been modeled by the non-homogeneous Pois-
son process, implying that human behavior is essentially
random. While both models are based on intuitive and
to some extent realistic assumptions, they are not able
to consider other human related factors properly, such
as how individual agents reply to the received e-mail or
phone call, and what is the benefit or cost of communi-
cation.
In order to investigate the role of human factors in
bursty human dynamics we devise a model, where an in-
dividual agent reacts upon the lack of information, such
that an information seeking agent sends an e-mail or
makes a phone call to an information provider. With
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this model we describe the time frame of how long peo-
ple wait for responses from the information providers
under uncertain (risky) situations and get insight into
which human factors in the daily communication are rel-
evant to the bursty dynamics. Here we start with an as-
sumption that an agent prefers a fixed amount of payoff
over a risky lottery of the same expected payoff, which
is called risk-aversion. A risk-averse agent can reduce
uncertainty by communicating for information, which is
a time-consuming process. Once an agent requests infor-
mation, we consider the time to wait for responses, i.e.
the waiting time, as a cost. This reflects a well-known
economic perspective that time and information are con-
sidered as tradable goods [10, 11]. Based on the trade-off
between the information gain and the cost of the waiting
time, the agent chooses an optimal waiting time. Note
that we confine our model to risk-averse agents because
the optimal waiting time for risk-pursuing agents is al-
ways zero and the waiting time does not matter for risk-
neutral agents unless the information gain is unequal to
the cost of time. By optimizing the waiting time, we de-
rive a specific (positive) relationship between the risk and
the optimal waiting time. Then, we show that the opti-
mal waiting time distribution follows a power-law, which
serves as theoretical support for the observed bursty dy-
namics in e-mail and mobile phone call communications.
Our model gives insight into the human communica-
tion dynamics, i.e. how people are concerned with the
communication efficiency and the cost per unit time while
deciding the communication channel as well as the time
to wait for responses. Since the efficiency and the cost
per unit time are heterogenous in different communica-
tion channels, the optimal channel depends on how ur-
gent the situations are and how patient the users are.
Furthermore, the efficiency and the cost per unit time
also change the optimal choice of the waiting time. We
find that if the cost per unit time dominates over the
efficiency, people are concerned with both the efficiency
and the cost per unit time under the low risk situation,
while they consider only the efficiency under the high
risk situation. This explains the effect of human factors
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2on communication such that in riskier situation people
tend to focus more on reducing the risk without concern-
ing the cost, because shortening the waiting time by the
efficient communication is preferred to concern the cost
itself. However, if the cost per unit time is dominated by
the efficiency, the result is opposite. People are concerned
with only the efficiency under the low risk situation and
consider both the efficiency and the cost per unit time
under the high risk situation, which implies that people
do not consider the cost per unit time seriously under the
low risk (short waiting time) but do under the high risk
(long waiting time). In conclusion the individual agents’
attitude towards risk can be one of the explanations for
the pattern of the waiting time in communication.
In Section II we describe and analyze the model and
explain the implications of the results. Then we make
conclusions in Section III.
II. MODEL
As in [12] we consider the risk-averse utility function,
u(x) of state X, whose degree of risk-aversion is measured
by A(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x). For simplicity, we set A(x) = 1
and then consider a risk-averse agent with utility function
given by
u(xt) = −e−xt + a (a ≥ 0), (1)
corresponding to a time-dependent state Xt. At the be-
ginning t = 0, the state X0 is uniformly distributed from
−∞ to ∞. Then, after waiting time t > 0 for infor-
mation about the state X, the agent reduces the uncer-
tainty on the state as Xt ∼ N(0, σ2/tγ). That is, the
state becomes more specified. The decreasing speed of
uncertainty is controlled by the parameter γ ≥ 0, which
we call efficiency.
As an example let us consider a job applicant who got
offers from 5 firms, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and let
X0 = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} be the set of wages of firms,
which is the initial “state” if the applicant is uninformed.
He chooses one of them and his utility depends on the
wage of the firm chosen such that u(wi) = −e−wi + a.
Then suppose that the applicant can obtain information
on the unknown wages. If the information he will get at
time t = 1 is the exact amount of w1, the state becomes
X1 = {w2, w3, w4, w5}. At time t = 1, the applicant
can make a clearer decision than he could at time t = 0
because the number of unknown wages at t = 1 is 4. As
the applicant knows the wages one-by-one, his decision
gets improved, and eventually at time t = 5, he will know
the firm of the highest wage so that the best decision
without uncertainty can be made.
The time the agent waits for information to reduce the
uncertainty can be considered as a cost. Let c(t) be the
cost of time t. For simplicity, we assume that the cost per
unit time is constant but dependent on the uncertainty
level σ2 such that c′(t) = kσ−2/β with positive k and
β. This assumption describes that given the level of the
uncertainty σ2, the cost of time is constantly increasing
in time t at the rate of uncertainty except for the case
with β = ∞. The larger value of β corresponds to the
larger cost of the time unit, indicating that the parameter
β controls the cost per unit time.
Now we define the agent’s expected utility at state Xt
subtracted by the cost of time as follows:
Π(t) = E[u(xt)]− c(t)
= a−
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
√
tγ
2piσ2
exp
(
−x− x
2tγ
2σ2
)
− c(t)
= a− exp
(
σ2
2tγ
)
− c(t). (2)
The agent chooses the optimal waiting time for informa-
tion. At t = τ maximizing Eq. (2), the following condi-
tion is satisfied:
γ
2
σ2
τγ+1
exp
(
σ2
2τγ
)
= c′(τ) = kσ−2/β . (3)
From this equation and by means of Lambert function
W (x), satisfying x = W (x)eW (x), we obtain the optimal
waiting time τ as a function of σ, as follows
τ(σ) = C1σ
2/γW
(
C2σ
2(β−γ)/[β(γ+1)]
)−1/γ
, (4)
where C1 ≡ [ γ2(γ+1) ]1/γ and C2 ≡ γ2(γ+1) ( 2kγ )γ/(γ+1).
We first consider the special case with β = γ, i.e. of
balancing the efficiency and the cost per unit time, lead-
ing to
τ(σ) = τcσ
2/γ (5)
with τc ≡ C1W (C2)−1/γ . By using the identity of
P (τ)dτ = P (σ)dσ and by assuming the distribution of
σ to be P (σ) = e−σ, we get the optimal waiting time
distribution P (τ) as
P (τ) =
γ
2τ
γ/2
c
τγ/2−1e−(τ/τc)
γ/2
(6)
∝ τ−αe−(τ/τc)γ/2 , (7)
with the power-law exponent α ≡ 1− γ/2 and the cutoff
waiting time τc. It turns out that α ≤ 1, which requires
the strong cutoff such as the (stretched) exponential one
as we have assumed.
Due to the technical differences among communication
channels, the optimal waiting time τ can be channel-
oriented. For example, one might wait longer for e-mail
responses than for face-to-face responses, and e-mail re-
sponses might be faster than post responses. Thus, it is
plausible that when people choose communication chan-
nels, they might expect different waiting time to different
channels and choose a suitable channel to the level of un-
certainty.
This channel preference can be considered in two ways:
the efficiency and the cost per unit time. Firstly, the
3parameter γ can be interpreted as the channel-oriented
sensitivity on uncertainty. Based on the empirical obser-
vation of α ≈ 1 and 0.7 for e-mail and MPC communica-
tions, respectively, one can argue that the corresponding
values of γ would be ≈ 0 and 0.6. This implies that e-
mail communication rarely reduces uncertainty as e-mail
users wait time for information. On the other hand, mo-
bile phone users can reduce uncertainty more efficiently.
In terms of the cost per unit time, the e-mail and the
MPC can be compared as follows:
c′e−mail(τ) ≈ 0 < c′MPC(τ) ≈
0.6
2
σ2
τ1.6
exp
(
σ2
2τ0.6
)
(8)
for τ > 0. Since the cost per unit time for e-mails is
lower than that for MPCs, the empirical observations
can be interpreted such that people are more patient
to wait for the e-mail responses than for the MPC re-
sponses. Hence e-mail (MPC) is less (more) efficient and
less (more) costly communication channel so that e-mail
is more suitable than MPC for non-urgent situations and
consequently people would prefer MPC when they need
information urgently.
Since the Eq. (4) cannot be expressed in terms of el-
ementary functions, we use the asymptotic expansions
of the Lambert function: W (x) ≈ x for x  1 and
W (x) ≈ lnx for x  1. Let us now consider the case
with β > γ, where the cost per unit time is dominant
over the efficiency. When σ  1, we obtain the scaling
relation
τ(σ) ∝ σδ1 , δ1 = 2(β + 1)
β(γ + 1)
. (9)
On the other hand, for the range of σ  1, the scaling
relation with logarithmic correction is obtained as
τ(σ) ∝ σδ2 [ln(σ/σ0)]−1/γ , δ2 = 2
γ
, (10)
where σ0 ≡ C−β(γ+1)/[2(β−γ)]2 . Therefore, we find two
scaling regimes as τ(σ) ∼ σδ1 for σ < σ× and τ(σ) ∼ σδ2
for σ > σ×, respectively. Here σ× denotes the crossover
uncertainty and also defines the crossover waiting time
τ× ≡ τ(σ×). It indicates that the optimal waiting time
distribution shows two scaling regimes with power-law
exponents α1 = 1 − 1/δ1 for τ < τ× and α2 = 1 − 1/δ2
for τ > τ×, respectively. Note that α1 < α2 for any
positive β and γ.
Intuitively, the optimal behavior of individual agents is
changing according to the risk. Under the low risk situa-
tion (σ < σ×), the power-law exponent α1 as a function
of β and γ explains the case where people are concerned
with the efficiency as well as the cost per unit time when
the risk is not significantly high. On the other hand,
under the high risk situation (σ > σ×), the power-law
exponent α2 = 1−γ/2 turns out to be independent of β.
Unlike for the low risk situations, people under the high
risk consider only the efficiency, i.e. it is better to obtain
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FIG. 1: Numerical solutions of τ(σ) for different values of
parameters: (a) β = ∞ and (b) β = 1/3. There are two
scaling regimes with different power-law exponents, guided
by the solid lines. The ‘(log)’ following the exponent value
denotes the fact that the power-law functions with logarithmic
correction, i.e. Eq. (10) and Eq. (13), are used.
information as quickly as possible due to the high cost
of time. Note that the special condition of β = γ yields
δ1 = δ2 = 2/γ, i.e. one scaling regime of optimal waiting
time distributions.
We investigate the full range of Eq. (4) by numerically
solving τ(σ) for various values of k, β, and γ. The effect
of constant k is systemically considered by scaling τ and
σ as τkβ/(β−γ) and σkβγ/[2(β−γ)], respectively. For each
set of β and γ, the solutions of τ(σ) for different values
of k collapse to the single scaling function f :
τ(σ) = k−β/(β−γ)f(σkβγ/[2(β−γ)]), (11)
where the scaling function f has two scaling regimes as
f(x) ∼
{
xδ1 if x < x×,
xδ2 if x > x×.
(12)
In the case with β = ∞, implying c′(τ) = k, we obtain
the numerical solutions for γ = 1 and 1/2 and for k =
10−4, 10−5, and 10−6. As shown in Fig. 1(a), for each
value of γ, the curves for different values of k collapse to
a single curve with two scaling regimes.
4Next, we consider the case where the cost per unit time
is dominated by the efficiency, i.e. β < γ. We find two
scaling regimes of τ(σ) as following:
τ(σ) ∝
{
σδ1 [ln(σ0/σ)]
−1/γ
, δ1 =
2
γ if σ < σ×,
σδ2 , δ2 =
2(β+1)
β(γ+1) if σ > σ×,
(13)
where σ0 = C
β(γ+1)/[2(γ−β)]
2 . The power-law exponent
for the low risk regime, α1, turns out to depend only on
γ, while the power-law exponent for the high risk regime,
α2, is a function of both β and γ. In other words, when
the cost per unit time is dominated by the efficiency,
people are concerned with only the efficiency under the
low risk situation. This is because under the low risk,
implying short waiting times, the cost of waiting time
is still negligible compared to efficiency. On the other
hand, people under the high risk are concerned with the
efficiency as well as on the cost per unit time because the
cost of time is not negligible any more due to the long
waiting time.
For the full range of τ(σ), we have numerically solved
the Eq. (4). In case with β = 1/3, implying c′(τ) =
kσ−2/3, we obtain the numerical solutions for γ = 1 and
1/2 and for k = 10−3, 10−4, and 10−5. As shown in
Fig. 1(b), for each value of γ, the curves for different
values of k collapse to a single curve of Eq. (11) with two
scaling regimes.
III. CONCLUSION
In order to investigate the role of human factors in
the bursty dynamics of individuals, we have studied an
agent-based model. Our model assumed an intrinsic hu-
man behavior, such as a trade-off between information
gain to avoid uncertainty and the cost of time to wait
for information. With the agent’s optimal choice for the
waiting time, the empirical waiting time distributions in
daily communication process have been explained.
The results we obtained by analytical derivation show
two scaling regimes for the waiting time distributions
with different power-law exponents, denoted by α. This
indicates that people have different attitudes on valuing
the efficiency and the cost per unit time, controlled by
γ and β, respectively. While α is generally expected to
be a function of both β and γ, the value of α turns out
to be independent of β in two cases: a) When β > γ
and under high risk situation, people are not concerned
with the cost per unit time because it is better to obtain
information as quickly as possible due to the high cost of
waiting time. b) When β < γ and under low risk situa-
tion, the cost of waiting time becomes negligible so that
people do not have to be concerned with the cost of time
unless the waiting time is significantly long.
We showed that the scaling behavior of optimal wait-
ing time distributions reveals which human factors in the
daily communication are considered as relevant to scal-
ing. We also expect that further studies to identify intrin-
sic properties of social agents as well as extension of this
model to interacting agents on complex networks would
be helpful in figuring out the origin of bursts in human
dynamics even in more details.
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